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​Abstract 
 
Blockchain technologies have generated excitement, yet their potential to enable new forms            
of governance remains largely unexplored. Two confronting standpoints dominate the          
emergent debate around ​blockchain-based ​governance: discourses characterised by the         
presence of techno-determinist and market-driven values, which tend to ignore the           
complexity of social organisation; and critical accounts of such discourses which, whilst            
contributing to identifying limitations, consider the role of traditional centralised institutions as            
inherently necessary to enable democratic forms of governance. Therefore the question           
arises, can we build perspectives of ​blockchain-based governance that go beyond markets            
and states? In this article we draw on the Nobel laureate economist Elinor Ostrom’s              
principles for self-governance of communities to explore the transformative potential of           
blockchain. We approach blockchain through the identification and conceptualisation of          
affordances that this technology may provide to communities. For each affordance, we carry             
out a detailed analysis situating each in the context of Ostrom’s principles, considering both              
the potentials of algorithmic governance and the importance of incorporating communities’           
social practices. The relationships found between these affordances and Ostrom’s principles           
allow us to provide a perspective focussed on blockchain-based commons governance. By            
carrying out this analysis, we aim to expand the debate from one dominated by a culture of                 
competition to one that promotes a culture of cooperation. 
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1.​ Introduction 
 
In November 2008 a paper published anonymously presented Bitcoin: the first           
cryptocurrency based purely on a peer-to-peer system (Nakamoto, 2008). For the first time,             
no third parties were necessary to solve problems such as double-spending. The solution             
was achieved through the introduction of a data structure known as a blockchain. In simple               
terms, a blockchain can be understood as a distributed and append-only ledger. Data, such              
as the history of transactions generated by using cryptocurrencies, can be stored in a              
blockchain without the need to trust a third party, such as a bank server. From a technical                 
perspective, blockchain enables the implementation of novel properties at an infrastructural           
level in a fully decentralised manner.  
 
The properties most cited by blockchain enthusiasts at this infrastructural level include            
immutability, transparency, persistency, resilience and openness (Underwood 2016; Wright         
& De Filippi 2015), among others. Certainly, some technical infrastructures could previously            
provide these properties, e.g. the immutability and openness provided by content           
repositories like Github or Arxiv.org, or the persistence and resilience provided by large web              
services such as Amazon or Facebook. However, the implementation of these solutions            
relied on a trusted third party. There have been other decentralised technical infrastructures             
with varying degrees of success which also reflect some of these properties, e.g. the Web               
has been traditionally shown as an example of openness, although with uneven persistence             
(Koehler 1999), or BitTorrent peer-to-peer sharing networks are considered open, resilient           
and partially transparent (Cohen 2003). However, none of the existing decentralised           
technologies have enabled all these properties (and others) at once in a robust manner,              
while maintaining a high degree of decentralisation. It is precisely the possibility of             
developing technological artefacts which rely on a fully distributed infrastructure that is            
generating enthusiasm, or “hype” according to some authors (Reber & Feuerstein, 2014),            
with regards to the potential applications of blockchain. 
 
In this article we focus on some of these potential applications of blockchain. More precisely,               
we reflect on the relationship between blockchain properties and the generation of            
potentialities which could facilitate governance processes. Particularly, we focus on the           
governance of Commons-Based Peer Production (CBPP) communities. The term, originally          
coined by Benkler (2002), refers to an emergent model of socio-economic production in             
which groups of individuals cooperate with each other to produce shared resources without a              
traditional hierarchical organisation (Benkler, 2006). There are multiple well-known examples          
of this phenomenon, such as Wikipedia, a project to collaboratively write a free             
encyclopedia; OpenStreetMap, a project to create free/libre maps of the World           
collaboratively; or Free/Libre Open Source Software (FLOSS) projects such as the operating            
system GNU/Linux or the browser Firefox. Research carried out drawing on crowdsourcing            
techniques (Fuster Morell et al., 2016a) found examples of the broad diversity of areas in               
which the collaborative work on commons is present. This includes open science, urban             
commons, peer funding and open design, to name but a few. Three main characteristics of               
this mode of production are salient in the literature on CBPP (Arvidsson et al., 2017). Firstly,                
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3272329 
CBPP is marked by decentralisation, since authority resides in individual agents rather than             
a central organiser. Secondly, it is commons-based because CBPP communities make           
frequent use of common resources, i.e. shared resources which are openly accessible and             
whose ownership is collectivised. These resources can be immaterial, such as source code             
in free software, or material, such as 3D printers shared in small-scale workshops known as               
Fab Labs. Thirdly, there is a prevalence of non-monetary motivations. These motivations            
are, however, commonly intertwined with extrinsic motivations. As a result, a wide spectrum             
of motivations and multiple forms of value operate in CBPP communities (Cheshire & Antin              
2008), beyond monetary value, e.g. use value, reputational and ecosystemic value (Fuster            
Morell et al., 2016b).  
 
The three aforementioned characteristics of peer production are in fact aligned with            
blockchain features. First, both CBPP and blockchain strongly rely on decentralised           
processes, thus, the possibility of using blockchain infrastructure to support CBPP processes            
arises. Secondly, the shared commons in CBPP corresponds to the shared ledger present in              
blockchain infrastructure, where data and rules are transparent, open, collectively owned,           
and in practice managed as a commons. This leads to the question if such blockchain               
commons could host or support commons resources, or “commonify” other features of CBPP             
communities, such as their rules of governance. Thirdly, CBPP relies on multi-dimensional            
forms of value and motivations, and blockchain enables the emergence of multiple types of              
non-monetary interactions (sharing, voting, reputation). This brings about the question of the            
new potentials for channelling CBPP community governance. 
 
Overall, we strongly believe that the combination of CBPP and blockchain provides an             
exciting field for exploration, in which the use of blockchain technologies is used to support               
the coordination efforts of these communities. This leads us to the research question: what              
affordances are generated by blockchain technologies which could facilitate the governance           5
of CBPP communities? 
2.​ The emergent debate on blockchain-based governance 
The use of blockchain technologies to facilitate governance processes is beginning to attract             
the attention of social scientists (Risius & Spohrer, 2017). The emergent literature revolves             
around speculation on whether blockchain technologies could foster the experimentation and           
rise of new forms of ​blockchain-based​ governance . 6
 
5 By "governance" we draw on Fuster Morell’s (2014) analysis and characterisation of commons              
governance as a complex system. Her work provides a critical account of approaches focussed              
exclusively on decision-making systems, including as part of her characterisation several aspects            
which emerge as key for our analysis, such as social norms and the social construction of                
collaboration platforms. 
6 This paper focuses on governance through or with blockchains, rather than on governance of               
FLOSS communities which develop and maintain blockchain projects. This is a relevant distinction             
since both debates are sometimes blurred. Conceptualising a blockchain as a common good, and              
therefore its governance as a commons-based process, is a promising approach to further our              
understanding of the social aspects behind the development of these decentralised technologies, but             
it is out of the scope of this paper.  
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Two confronting standpoints dominate the emergent debate. On the one hand are            
perspectives characterised by a high degree of techno-determinism. These perspectives          
envisage the emergence of new forms of ​blockchain-based governance on the basis of the              
potential of these technologies for decentralisation and trustlessness. The discourses          
inherently embed the idea of “market”, but tend to ignore the complexity of social              
organisation. For example, they commonly assume that hierarchies between the participants           
in decision-making processes vanish thanks to the disintermediation enabled by blockchain           
technologies (e.g Swan, 2015; Hayes, 2016; Heuermann, 2015). Overall, they tend to            
provide over-reductionist accounts with regards to the distribution of power, failing to            
acknowledge issues such as the generation of oligarchies (Freeman, 1972; Shaw & Hill,             
2014; De Filippi & Loveluck, 2016; De Filippi & Lavayssiere, 2018). These            
techno-determinist perspectives are not new, nor a particular issue for blockchain           
technologies. Similar approaches can be traced, for example, to during the popularisation of             
access to the Internet in the 1990s. Examples of techno-determinist perspectives similarly            
embedded ideas to “creat[e] a world that all may enter without privilege or prejudice              
accorded by race, economic power, military force, or station of birth.” (Barlow, 1996).             
Overall, parallels can be observed between these views and those of the Internet as a space                
for utopia or dystopia (Wellman, 2004). On this occasion, discourses are being generated             
around blockchain technologies. 
 
On the other hand, the critical stand against these techno-determinist perspectives has            
identified and criticised the limitations of such approaches (Atzori, 2015; Atzori & Ulieru,             
2017). Nevertheless, this critique is built upon the reinforcement of the role of traditional              
central authorities. These views consider traditional central authorities as inherently          
necessary to enable democratic governance. As a result, the potential for communities, such             
as the aforementioned CBPP communities, to successfully self-organise is ignored. These           
views reflect the traditional responses against unregulated markets from positions that           
reinforce the role of states. In this case, blockchain properties are envisioned in             
non-transformative ways to more efficiently exert the control required by traditional           
centralised forms of governance. For example, providing more transparency to their central            
institutions (Nguyen, 2016) or more efficient mechanisms to avoid tax fraud (Ainsworth &             
Shact, 2016). 
 
In this article we aim to reflect on the extent to which it would be feasible to incorporate into                   
the social construction of ​blockchain-based tools principles from commons governance. Our           
aim is to contribute to building perspectives which neither rely on the logics of private               
markets, as implicitly assumed by these former perspectives, nor on the coercion of             
traditional centralised institutions, as in the case of the latter accounts. To this end, we bring                
together the literature on governance of CBPP for the emerging debate on these new forms               
of ​blockchain-based governance. Recently, a few authors have attempted to link the            
commons with blockchain capabilities, either at a general conceptual level (O’Dwyer, 2015;            
Bollier, 2015; Davidson et al., 2016) or proposing specific theoretical systems (De Filippi,             
2015; Pazaitis et al., 2017). In contrast, in this work we will perform a detailed and                
systematic analysis of the affordances of blockchain for CBPP community governance.  
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In this analysis we acknowledge the transformative potential of blockchain properties, and            
argue that they should be understood as a situated technology (Bell et al. 2003). That is, the                 
focus needs to be placed within the situational parameters, being aware of the cultural              
context and incorporating social meanings into the design of artefacts of collaboration which             
make use of the aforementioned properties. As a result, we reflect on whether blockchain              
technologies could be the source of new affordances (Gibson, 1979) for commons            
governance. By affordances we draw on Hutchby’s (2001, p. 444) definition as the             
“functional and relational aspects which frame, while not determining, the possibilities for            
agentic action in relation to an object”. Thus, our approach is that of a mutual-shaping               
between technology and society. In this way, we are critical of the limitations of              
techno-determinist perspectives. However, while we consider the socially shaped character          
of ​blockchain-based technologies — in which choices are built and chosen socially — we              
follow an approach in which these technologies are understood as a possible agent of              
change. This is in order to discuss the role of distributed technologies as a source of                
affordances, as required in this type of reflection, rather than simply explaining its             
emergence, as pure constructivist approaches would do . 7
 
With this purpose, we develop from traditional studies on the organisational aspects of how              
commons are governed, and evaluate the potential use of blockchain technologies in this             
context. More specifically, we aim to contribute to this discussion by drawing on the work of                
the Nobel laureate economist Ostrom (1990), whose research showed that under certain            
conditions commons can be managed in a sustainable way by local communities of peers.              
Her work, therefore, enables us to reflect on the use of blockchain technologies to foster               
experimentation with new forms of ​blockchain-based governance in ways that go beyond            
markets and states. 
3​. Ostrom’s principles: beyond markets and states 
 
Ostrom’s studies focussed on how communities manage to successfully govern communal           
resources by revisiting Hardin’s (1968) influential article on “The tragedy of the commons". In              
this article, Hardin states how resources shared by individuals acting as homo-economicus,            
i.e. out of self-interest in order to maximise their own benefit, results in the depletion of the                 
commons. The individuals' interests enter into conflict with the group's, and because they act              
independently according to their short-term interests, the result of the collective action            
depletes the commons. As a consequence, the traditional view was that in order to avoid this                
logic — “If I do not use it, someone else will” — which leads to unsustainability, it was                  
necessary to manage these commons through either private ownership or public           
administration. Parallels can be found between these standpoints and those previously           
summarised with regards to the emergent discussion on new forms of ​blockchain-based            
governance: they envision forms of governance which either rely on markets or on states. 
7 The selection of the term “affordance” and, in more general terms, a mutual-shaping approach               
allows us to navigate the Scylla and Charybdis of technological determinism and technological             
constructivism present in the field of science and technology studies (Juris, 2012, p. 275). See               
Wellman et al. (2003), boyd (2010) and Juris (2012) for examples in the use of affordances in the                  
context of analysis in the Internet, social media and social movements respectively. 
 
 Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3272329 
Ostrom’s work shows how, under certain conditions, commons can indeed be managed in a              
sustainable way by local communities of peers. Her approach takes into account that             
individual agents do not operate in isolation, nor are they driven solely by self interest, i.e.                
beyond homo-economicus approaches. Instead, she argues that communities communicate         
to build common protocols and rules that ensure their sustainability. This hypothesis was             
strongly supported by a meta-analysis of a wide range of case studies (Ostrom, 1990), and               
has been confirmed in later research (Ostrom, 2005; Cox et al. 2010). As part of this work,                 
she identified a set of principles (Ostrom, 1990, pp. 88-102) for the successful management              
of these commons (Viégas et al., 2007; Forte et al., 2009): 
 
1. Clearly defined community boundaries: in order to define who has rights and            
privileges within the community. 
2. Congruence between rules and local conditions: the rules that govern behaviour or            
commons use in a community should be flexible and based on local conditions that              
may change over time. These rules should be intimately associated with the            
commons, rather than relying on a “one-size-fits-all” regulation. 
3. Collective choice arrangements: in order to best accomplish congruence (principle          
number 2), people who are affected by these rules should be able to participate in               
their modification, and the costs of alteration should be kept low. 
4. Monitoring: some individuals within the community act as monitors of behaviour in            
accordance with the rules derived from collective choice arrangements, and they           
should be accountable to the rest of the community. 
5. Graduated sanctions: community members actively monitor and sanction one         
another when behaviour is found to conflict with community rules. Sanctions against            
members who violate the rules are aligned with the perceived severity of the             
infraction. 
6. Conflict resolution mechanisms: members of the community should have access to           
low-cost spaces to resolve conflicts. 
7. Local enforcement of local rules: local jurisdiction to create and enforce rules should             
be recognised by higher authorities. 
8. Multiple layers of nested enterprises: by forming multiple nested layers of           
organisation, communities can address issues that affect resource management         
differently at both broader and local levels. 
 
Although these principles were originally defined for natural commons, they have also been             
discussed and adapted for the study of communities which develop and maintain digital             
commons (e.g. Hess & Ostrom, 2007; Hess, 2008; Fuster Morell, 2010), such as Wikipedia              
(Viégas et al., 2007; Forte et al., 2009) or Free/Libre Open Source Software such as Drupal                
(Rozas, 2017). This process of employing Ostrom’s principles in the study of how             
communities manage digital commons required, however, an analysis of how they may be             
re-interpreted within this different context. For example, while Ostrom’s 1​st principle for            
natural commons refers to the boundaries defined to use certain resources, in the case of               
digital commons this was re-interpreted in the context of the power to modify digital              
commons or to perform certain operations on the collaboration platforms employed by these             8
8 Examples of these collaboration platforms are MediaWiki for the case of Wikipedia or Drupal.org for                
the case of Drupal. 
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communities. In the case of Wikipedia, this was re-interpreted as the process of demarcation              
to perform certain technical operations and the relationship between technical and social            
power (Forte et al., 2009, pp. 64-68). Similarly, in the case of the FLOSS community Drupal,                
this principle was contextualised in the emergence of clearer boundaries to participate in the              
production and management of FLOSS subprojects (Rozas, 2017, pp. 183-192, 207-211). 
Another illustrative example of these exercises of re-interpretation can be found in principle             
number 7, which relates to the acknowledgement of local jurisdiction to create and enforce              
local rules by higher authorities. In the case of natural commons, these higher authorities are               
commonly referred to as those of state institutions. An example could be government             
officials who acknowledge the creation of local rules in the context of self-organised fishing              
communities. Parallelisms have been established in the case of digital commons, but            
referring to higher authorities as the most formal and centralised institutions which commonly             
emerged in these communities, such as the Wikimedia Foundation (Forte et al., 2009), or              
the Drupal Association (Rozas, 2017), to continue with the previous cases. For example, in              
the emergence of autonomous WikiProjects, where jurisdiction to devise their own local rules             
is acknowledged by the more central authorities of Wikipedia. Also, the acknowledgement of             
the local jurisdiction of contributed projects with respect to Drupal core, or of local institutions               
with respect to the global institution, the Drupal Association. 
 
Over the course of the next section we draw on and re-interpret these principles, but               
focussing in this case on the identification and exploration of affordances generated by             
blockchain technologies which could foster, limit or affect the governance of communities            
which collectively manage and produce commons. 
 
​4​. Affordances generated by blockchain for commons governance 
 
Beyond the previously introduced original properties of blockchain at an infrastructural level,            
the growth of the blockchain development ecosystem has encompassed the rise of a new              
generation of applications and capabilities which surpass those of the original Bitcoin            
whitepaper. This follows a common pattern in the evolution of technological artefacts: from             
an initial innovative invention, a period of experimentation spurs multiple alternative designs            
and derived works, which are often consolidated in different generations of the technology.             
For instance, the bicycle followed a non-linear evolution, since the invention of the             
“velocipede” in 1812. It experimented 50 years of extraordinary diversity of designs, until a              
solid second generation with connected pedals emerged in the 1860s, a third generation of              
high wheelers in the 1870s, and finally the modern bicycle was invented in the 1890s               
(Shennan 2009).  
 
In the case of blockchain-related technologies, we are still witnessing its infancy, and thus its               
future potential is yet to be explored. It is often considered (Swan, 2015) that the first                
generation of blockchain technologies, “Blockchain 1.0”, are Bitcoin and the advent of a             
broad diversity of crypto-currencies that appeared after it (“altcoins”), i.e. roughly from 2009             
to 2013. The second generation, “Blockchain 2.0”, was the extension of these blockchains             
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with capabilities beyond currencies, i.e. automatic agreements in “smart contracts”, or           
complex tokens, from 2014 until today.  
 
Beyond all the emergent technical concepts and jargon, the key consideration is that we              
incorporate these new generations of blockchain technologies, and thus their capacities, into            
our discussion. We identify and discuss a set of affordances, for a non-technical audience, in               
the context of governance through blockchain. Each affordance is situated in the context of              
commons governance drawing on the aforementioned principles of Ostrom’s work .  9
 
We use a recurring example throughout the text. We select a specific type of Commons               
Based Peer Production, a community network. In these communities, people share wifi            
signals as common resources as well as the infrastructure to provide internet access (e.g.              
antennas, routers, Internet bandwidth). Examples of these communities include Guifi.net ,          10
Ninux or Sarantoporo . Usually, these communities involve complex governance including          11 12
online and offline interactions at several levels of organisation: from local nodes to umbrella              
communities. 
4.1 ​ Tokenisation 
An essential feature of Blockchain technologies is their capacity for tokenisation.           
Tokenisation refers to the process of transforming the rights to perform an action on an asset                
into a transferable data element (named ​token​) on the blockchain. For example, in the              
medical field, tokenisation has been employed to provide authorisation regarding access to            
reports (Liu, 2016). 
 
In the Bitcoin blockchain, the term ​token ​is used as an abstraction of the actual “coin”, i.e.                 
the cryptocurrency being transferred among users. The rise of ​blockchain-based          
cryptocurrencies is a product of such a feature, since blockchain’s facility for the creation,              
transfer and management of tokens in a distributed manner is unparalleled. This process of              
tokenisation facilitates the distribution of value and incentives. Third parties, such as banks             
or gateways, are not necessary to transfer value between individuals or across networks.             
Furthermore, such tokens may be used as more than holders of monetary value: they may               
represent equity, decision-making power, property ownership or labour certificates with          
similar properties (Huckle & White, 2016, pp. 7-10) as those described by Marx (1875). 
 
Blockchain is originated in the creation and maintenance of a currency. Thus, its structure              
responds to such a need, where the append-only database that the blockchain entails             
corresponds to a ledger, and the operations are defined as transactions. In such a system,               
the creation of tokens is inherent to how the technology is constructed. This capacity for               
tokenisation of blockchain technologies provides a series of affordances for technological           
artefacts constructed to facilitate governance. In the context of CBPP communities,           
tokenisation relates to several of Ostrom’s principles.  
 
9 Table 5.1 summarises the relation among the affordances and Ostrom’s principles. 
10 See ​http://guifi.net​, last accessed on 20/07/2018. 
11 See ​http://ninux.org​, last accessed on 20/07/2018. 
12 See ​http://www.sarantaporo.gr​, last accessed on 20/07/2018. 
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Ostrom’s 1​st principle states the importance of the definition of community boundaries for its              
governance. These boundaries are reflected in the rules embedded in software employed to             
coordinate communal activity in CBPP. This software typically defines permissions or rights            
to access or modify resources or community rules. In such a context, we can envision the                
use of tokens to construct tools, in which participation rights can be more easily and               
granularly defined, propagated and/or revoked. For example, in the case of a community             
network, access to the infrastructure could be granted with tokens, e.g. those people who              
contributed enough infrastructure, or who paid the agreed price, could access the Internet             
through the network. This specific use of blockchain has been proposed by Guifi.net, one of               
the most relevant community networks (Selimi et al., 2018). 
 
Negotiations regarding the definition of boundaries and their reflection in the technical            
artefacts connect additionally to the 2​nd and 3​rd of Ostrom’s principles. CBBP communities             
require constant processes of development of collective choice arrangements regarding their           
governance. They define rules based on local conditions, and seek to find ways in which               
those affected by these rules can participate in their modification, as understood in the 2​nd               
and 3​rd​ of the principles.  
 
Overall, the capacity for tokenisation of blockchain technologies could be employed to            
readdress latent power relations in these communities. Negotiations in these communities,           
whilst maintaining a social character, would be mediated by ​blockchain-based artefacts           
which in turn would be communally constructed (as in the aforementioned mutual-shaping).            
This implies an exercise by the community to specify the tasks to be carried out providing an                 
opportunity for certain often-forgotten tasks, such as care labour (Pérez-Orozco, 2014, pp.            
92-94), to be made visible. That is, care tasks such as emotional labour, conflict              
management, maintenance, or events organisation, may be visibilised and acknowledged by           
the community – along with those undertaking such tasks. Tokenisation, therefore, provides            
an opportunity to rethink existing power dynamics within CBPP communities.  
 
In this respect, some concepts from feminist economic theory, such as that of invisible labour               
(Pérez-Orozco, 2014, pp. 206), can be helpful for commons-based approaches towards the            
use of ​blockchain-based tools for governance in the need to escape from techno-determinist             
views. Such views envision these problems as a simple matter of atomic interactions to              
aggregate or disaggregate rights to access, at an individual level. This paper proposes an              
investigation into the potential of tokenisation to address this imbalance, such as through the              
visibilisation of certain forms of power, an issue which tends to become more critical when               
CBPP communities need to scale up their self-organisational processes. 
 
Nevertheless, tokenisation also presents risks, such as extreme quantification and data           
fetishism (Sharon & Zandbergen, 2017). Techno-determinist discourses assume that         
"anything that can be decentralized will be" (Johnston, 2014), and at least partially tokenised              
as a result. On the contrary, we believe communities and further empirical research will need               
to explore the limits regarding what kind of actions should or should not be tokenised, what                
kind of mechanisms are established to change the status quo, and how communities asses              
the desirable degree of tokenisation in their governance. In other words, there is a need to                
further understand the affordance of tokenisation and explore how self-organised          
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communities may or may not incorporate it in their technological artefacts employed for             
collaboration and to what extent. 
4.2 ​ Self-enforcement and formalisation of rules 
Some of the most recent blockchains (e.g. Ethereum ) have introduced the ability to upload              13
small snippets of code (so-called ​smart contracts​) directly onto the blockchain, for them to be               
executed in a decentralised manner by every node of the network. The rules embedded in               
the code are automatically enforced by the underlying technology, the blockchain.           
Self-enforcement refers precisely to this process of encoding clauses into source code in a              
manner which is automatically enforced and executed without the need for a central             
authority (Szabo, 1997). The potential of smart contracts for governance is perhaps an area              
in which the affordances regarding the use of blockchain-based artefacts to facilitate            
governance have been more widely discussed in the emergent literature (e.g. Wright & De              
Filippi, 2015; De Filippi & Hassan, 2016).  
 
Two main aspects can be identified as intertwined with Ostrom’s principles in the context of               
the governance of CBPP communities. Firstly, an affordance for the self-enforcement of            
rules. Examples of these rules are those which regulate the monitoring and graduated             
sanctions, as reflected in Ostrom’s 4​th and 5​th principles. Blockchain technologies could            
partially embed some of these governance rules in technological artefacts. Scenarios in            
which communities define certain rules regarding the allocation of common resources —            
through actions such as pooling, capping or mutualising — and in which these rules are               
automatically enforced can be envisioned. Following previous examples, one can imagine a            
capping rule agreed by a community network which automatically enforces a previously            
negotiated internet bandwidth limit, or which automatically penalises a misuse of the            
common network. Another example could consist of a set of self-enforced rules for a              
redistribution mechanism that grants Internet access to those in the communities with fewer             
resources. It can be envisioned how at least a significant part of the monitoring could be                
embedded into the code, instead of requiring participants to manually perform some of these              
monitoring operations. As in the case of tokenisation the issue resides in improving our              
understanding of the limitations of automatic self-enforcement in the context of these            
communities.  
 
Secondly, the affordance of self-enforcement generated by blockchain technologies requires          
the rules to be unambiguously understood by machines. This implies a need to formalise the               
governance rules which are usually expressed in the inherently ambiguous natural language.            
Thus, this explicitation could lead to the need to discuss these rule changes in order to                
formalise and encode them. It therefore provides an affordance for formalising rules which             
presents several limitations, which will be subsequently discussed, but also a set of             
potentialities. Research on how self-organisation occurs in CBPP communities has shown           
that, counterintuitively to the initial oversimplified accounts criticised by authors such as            
Viégas et al. (2007) or Mateos-García & Steinmueller (2008), the changes experienced in             
the self-organisational processes of CBPP communities tend to show an increase in the             
degree of formalisation around decision-making over time when they grow, which is            
13 See ​https://www.ethereum.org​, last accessed on 20/07/2018. 
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explained as a means to achieve decentralisation and to scale up communities (e.g. Viégas              
et al., 2007; Forte et al., 2009; Schweik & English, 2013; Wang & Cheliotis, 2016). This has                 
been identified even in cases with a generally anti-bureaucratic attitude, such as            
communities with a strong hacker culture which aim to avoid formal and bureaucratised             
systems (Rozas, 2017). Thus, the process of explicitation of rules which is encompassed in              
the development of smart contracts related to the use of distributed technologies also             
provides opportunities to make these rules more available and visible for discussion, as             
noted in the 2​nd of Ostrom’s principles. Furthermore, formalisation in combination with            
self-enforcement relates to the 7​th of Ostrom’s principles: local nodes of CBPP communities             
could more easily ensure that the local jurisdiction and enforcement of local rules is              14
acknowledged by higher authorities or by other nodes. For example, an organisational            
structure of a large community network in which a set of local nodes are federated, and each                 
node possesses local autonomy to develop its own rules regarding the management of the              
local infrastructure. A node might be based in Barcelona and another in Madrid. Rules can               
be envisioned in which the autonomy to take decisions regarding the node in Barcelona              
belongs, by code, to the participants of that node, and vice-versa. Furthermore, if higher              
authorities exist in this context, such as an Iberian federation of nodes, to continue with our                
example, we can imagine rules which are self-enforced by code to ensure that the local               
aspects are only decided by participants of the local nodes. Overall, blockchain technologies             
provide affordances to foster the formalisation and enforcement of this type of agreements. 
 
Several issues, however, require further exploration with regards to the affordances of            
self-enforcement and formalisation in the context of governance of CBPP communities.           
Firstly, rules embedded in smart contracts rely on an ​ex-ante nature, rather than ​ex-post (De               
Filippi & Hassan, 2016). Instead of third parties or community members monitoring and             
enforcing them, the rules would be automatically enforced according to agreements           
previously negotiated by the community. While this theoretically increases the difficulty to            
breach them, it also presents problems with regards to the difficulty to define exceptions (De               
Filippi & Hassan, 2016). Ongoing blockchain projects of the new generation, such as             
DAOStack or Aragon , provide capacities to more easily upgrade the rules embedded in             15 16
smart contracts over time, in congruence with the 2​nd of Ostrom’s principles. Thus, this              
increasing capacity for upgradability which is being developed in the new generation of             
blockchain technologies could help to incorporate these exceptions over time. However,           
even if a rule is updated after reaching an agreement in the community, the original code will                 
have been applied and the new rules will only be applicable the next time. For instance, a                 
person could lose Internet access due to a strict community rule that is later relaxed. From                
these limitations, we envision at least two questions which require further empirical research:             
what are the consequences for CBPP communities of moving from ​ex-post forms of             
regulation towards ​ex-ante​? Which aspects should remain in/off the blockchain, or           
furthermore completely in/out of code? 
    
14 In this context we refer to jurisdiction as the area over which the members of the node have control                    
(Sullivan, 2009). 
15 See ​https://daostack.io​, last accessed on 13/07/2018. 
16 See ​https://aragon.one​, last accessed on 13/07/2018.  
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Secondly, the process of formalisation of these rules requires, at least with the most current               
technology, a high degree of technical knowledge in the translation of these rules into source               
code. Thus, while formalisation might help to make these rules more visible and available for               
discussion in the community, the power to specify these rules may now be shifted to those                
coding the rules. In this context, it is necessary to consider the biases — such as gender,                 
race and class (Platero, 2014, pp. 79-95) — of those possessing this technical knowledge.              
Another issue to be considered is the tendency towards accommodation or less reflexivity             
over time as a consequence of automation (De Filippi & Hassan, 2015). Commons-based             
approaches should, as a result, take into account these aspects, and draw on inclusive              
methodologies to constantly co-design artefacts in order to address these issues. 
 
Thirdly, in a similar way as with the risk of extreme tokenisation presented in the previous                
section, there is a risk of extreme formalisation in the rules that regulate the behaviour of                
participants in these communities. The effects are unknown. Ostrom's work highlighted, for            
example, the relevance of informal social norms (Ostrom, 2000) for the successful            
self-management of resources. The effects of an excessive formalisation of norms into            
explicit rules self-enforced “by code” might become a source of distortions within the             
dynamics of the communities which requires further exploration. 
 
In sum, and continuing with our previous critique of techno-determinist views illustrated by             
the motto "anything that can be decentralized will be" (Johnston, 2014) — and at least               
partially formalised and self-enforced as a result —, commons-based approaches will require            
further understanding of these affordances regarding formalisation and self-enforcement in          
ways which are situated within the context of these communities. Rather than            
“one-size-fits-all” situations, the aim is to find ways to integrate the social culture and              
practices into platforms employed for collaboration, while exploring how they may achieve            
this and what the limits are. 
4.3 ​ Autonomous Automatisation 
The rules embedded in smart contracts may interact with humans, but also with other smart               
contracts, as long as they belong to the same blockchain ecosystem (e.g. Ethereum). It is               
analogous to software communicating with or depending on other software today. Thus, a             
complex set of smart contracts may be set up in such a way as to make it possible for                   
multiple parties to interact with each other. This combination of smart contracts may be              
regarded as a decentralised autonomous organisation (DAO): a self-governed organisation          
controlled exclusively by its embedded set of rules, implemented in the form of a smart               
contract. This may be understood as analogous to a legal organisation, with legal documents              
(bylaws) which define the rules of interaction among members. Similarly, the DAO members’             
interactions are mediated by the rules embedded in the DAO code.  
 
DAOs present multiple, unparalleled characteristics. The level of autonomy of these pieces            
of code surpasses all forms of autonomous software agents (Franklin & Graesser 1996).             
Since DAOs do not rely on central servers, DAOs cannot be shut down, unless explicitly               
programmed in their code. Thus, they are fully autonomous including with respect to their              
creator, and they function as long as a user (human or software) continues to interact with                
them. This may prevent censorship and the halt of malicious code, e.g. a virus. In addition,                
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DAOs may interact as autonomous users in the network, holding tokens and assets, or              
purchasing services from other DAOs. In fact, they can even ​hire ​users to perform tasks for                
them, and ​sell ​their own services or resources to third-parties. Hence, individuals can             
transact with a DAO in order to benefit from the service it provides, or to be paid for a                   
contribution. Thus, DAOs may be self-sufficient, to the extent that they can charge users for               
their own services (or assets) in order to pay for the services they need (De Filippi & Hassan                  
2016). 
 
There are a few existing DAO examples: the venture capital fund with the (confusing) name,               
“TheDAO ”; the prediction market, Augur ; the digital assets platform focused on gold            17 18
assets, Digix ; or the cryptocurrency issuer and insurer, MakerDAO . As it is true for the               19 20
vast majority of projects in the blockchain field, they are directly related to finance. These               
DAOs are designed to work in a decentralised manner without central intermediaries, yet             
their governance model is strictly market-driven. For instance, in TheDAO, voting power is             
correlated with the number of tokens possessed, i.e. it works as a plutocracy, controlled by               
the wealthy minority (as opposed to a democracy). 
 
However, DAOs provide new possibilities with regards to CBPP. In fact, we may envision              
scenarios in which DAOs aid several of Ostrom’s principles in the context of the governance               
of CBPP communities. As mentioned in the previous section, smart contracts may help in the               
monitoring and application of sanctions for those violating the community rules (4​th and 5​th              
principles). When DAOs are considered, this feature is strengthened, since communities           
may rely on an automated entity for such monitoring and sanctioning. The agency of this               
entity, which may take the initiative and react upon circumstances, may have multiple             
implications. On the one hand, its impersonalisation may be positive to see that sanctions              
come from a community decision, preventing the common effect of reacting against the             
enforcer (“killing the messenger”). On the other hand, the same impersonalisation may            
trigger frustrations and impotence (Postman 1992) similar to the reactions against machines.  
 
DAOs may also contribute to higher degrees of automatisation of the processes in             
communities, facilitating scaling up and thus the creation of layers of nested entities, as the               
8​th principle states. Since we are aware that scaling up communities involves an increase of               
formalisation and bureaucratisation (e.g. Viégas et al., 2007; Forte et al., 2009; Schweik &              
English, 2013; Wang & Cheliotis, 2016; Rozas, 2017), a higher degree of automatisation of              
processes could reduce the burden of bureaucracy, accelerate processes and facilitate           
scaling up. For instance, in a community network with multiple nodes, it is common to have                
multiple spaces for coordination, monitoring, verification, transfers of payments and          
resources, etc. Despite clear rules, the need remains for humans to carry out multiple              
actions. Many communities rely on software to automate parts of this process, although this              
implies either governance of such software/infrastructure, or dependence on third-parties          
and their rules for their inner processes. In such a context, a DAO can be set up to facilitate                   
interaction and coordination across nodes. Once the rules are agreed and clear, they may              
17 See ​https://daohub.org​, last accessed on 20/07/2018. 
18 See ​https://augur.net​, last accessed on 20/07/2018. 
19 See ​https://digix.io​, last accessed on 20/07/2018. 
20 See ​https://makerdao.com​, last accessed on 20/07/2018. 
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be embedded in the DAO code, which may automate a large proportion of the processes,               
monitoring the nodes’ actions, facilitating coordination, even transferring        
payments/resources in relation to the nodes’ contributions. In fact, this may be scaled up              
easily, with DAOs coordinating other “smaller” DAOs. And if other communities have their             
own DAOs, it may be easier to establish cooperation across communities.  
 
To continue with previous examples, we could envision collaboration among different           
community networks, granting Internet access to all members of any other community.            
These communities could share information about unconforming users to prevent network           
abuses and could even negotiate exchanges to account for the differences in use of the               
networks. 
 
Finally, DAOs provide a space in which governance is digitalised and formalised, and where              
most organisational processes should be tackled in some way, including conflicts. That is,             
governance formalisation demands an exploration of the different potential conflicts that may            
occur, and their possible resolution. This is directly related to Ostrom’s 6​th principle.             
Combined with the aforementioned automatisation and scaling up, we may observe a space             
in which conflicts are made explicit, between members of a DAO, across DAOs, and              
between DAOs and humans. This encourages communities to establish clear mechanisms           
for conflict resolution, which may be at least partially tackled by automated processes. In              
fact, Aragon is already working on creating digital jurisdictions for conflict resolution within,             
and across, DAOs. 
 
There are, however, some shortcomings of this affordance. Indeed, such a “DAO world” has              
multiple potentials, and yet, it is worth remembering that DAOs are constrained to the digital               
world. That is, digitalisation is expanding quickly, and affecting the physical world in multiple              
ways, and yet the physical world continues to operate with its own rules. Although              
techno-determinist views often disregard this fact, humans have bodies, which are           
constrained by their physical reality, and cannot be ignored or “disappear” in cyberspace (Le              
Breton, 2015). Thus, DAOs may allow digital voting, but a DAO cannot know if a person is                 
being coerced into a certain vote option. DAOs may allow the transfer of digital assets, and                
yet laptops can be stolen. Moreover, DAOs’ acceleration of digitalisation has direct effects             
on people with functional diversity, e.g. with special needs or disabilities, who may have              
difficulties to adapt to such a context.  
 
In the same line, DAOs may hire services or resolve conflicts, and yet there is a legal                 
framework that humans are subject to that may contradict the DAOs’ decisions. In fact,              
DAOs open up multiple unresolved challenges with respect to Law (De Filippi & Wright,              
2018). For instance, on liability: who is liable for a DAO misaction, such as the loss of                 
money? The creator of the DAO, who may not control it? The members of the DAO, who                 
could influence its evolution? The project managing the blockchain where the DAO            
operates? Or is it worth considering the DAO itself as a subject of liability?  
 
Summing up, the use of DAOs for commons governance is currently highly speculative and              
it may imply challenges and risks. However, multiple opportunities may arise from using             
these new “agents” as automatic helpers for communities, which would enable the            
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automatisation of bureaucratic processes, facilitate scaling up, and make conflict resolution           
mechanisms more explicit.  
 
 
4.4 ​ Decentralisation of power over infrastructure 
 
This affordance refers to the process of communalising the ownership and control of the              21
technological artefacts employed by the community through the decentralisation of the           
infrastructure they rely on. 
 
This affordance can be illustrated when exploring the relationships between technical and            
social power (Forte et al., 2009, pp. 64-68) which occur in CBPP communities together with               
the forms of pressure that relate to them. The control over the infrastructure which sustains,               
for example, the main platforms of collaboration, commonly emerges as a point of tension              
and conflict. When CBPP communities start to grow substantially, they normally try to             
decentralise control over this infrastructure, which is commonly achieved by incrementing the            
degree of formalisation. For example, defining more explicit and rigid organisational           
processes, roles and even formal institutions, such as the Wikimedia Foundation (Forte et             
al., 2009) or the Drupal Association (Rozas, 2017, pp. 67-87) returning to our previous              
examples. These organisational changes entail constant negotiation. When framed through          
Ostrom’s principles, these negotiations can be understood as part of the generation of             
collective-choice arrangements, the 3​rd of the principles previously discussed. Contrary to           
romanticised views, these negotiations do not commonly occur in a scenario of equality in              
terms of power. 
 
In the case of FLOSS projects, for example, these differences of power are illustrated by the                
existence of roles such as the Benevolent Dictator For Life (BDFL). BDFL (Benkler, 2013,              
pp. 225-226) refers to an informal title received by community leaders in FLOSS             
communities with high social capital — commonly the founders. BDFLs have the final word              
in the community regarding disputes lacking consensus. In addition to higher social capital,             
BDFLs also tend to have full power over infrastructure in the early stages of the project. Over                 
the course of the constant processes of negotiation, the “right to fork” plays a significant role                
(Nyman, 2015). Forking, in FLOSS communities, occurs when participants take a copy of             
source code from one project and start a new, independent and distinct version of it . The                22
“threat of forking” conditions the processes of negotiation, since participants holding more            
power are expected to maintain a general direction of the project which acknowledges and              
21 As discussed in footnote 6, in this article we focus our analysis on governance through blockchains.                 
For this reason, we will not tackle the relationships between technical and social power in the                
underlying protocols. Examples or these are the identification of strategies regarding the mining             
protocol to control the system by Ittay & GünSirer (2014), and the inequalities generated by the                
accumulation of hashing-power. See Atzori (2015, pp. 16-19) for further details on these risks and               
limitations. 
22 This right is based on one of the main freedoms of FLOSS (Stallman, 2002). ​However, it is typically                   
left as a last resource, since this might provoke the division of the community. The meanings have,                 
however, evolved over the years. See Nyman (2015) for a detailed analysis of the changes in the                 
meaning of fork in FLOSS communities over time. 
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includes the main desires of the community. In simplified terms, the threat of forking the               
code conditions the BDFLs, or the more participatory institutions which might emerge over             
time, to “maintain their benevolence”. BDFLs and/or institutions need to be perceived as             
accountable and legitimate in the eyes of the community, and they commonly respond by              
limiting and distributing their power over time. 
 
While, in technical terms, forking code has become a simple operation, forking the             
infrastructure remains a complex matter which is significantly costly in terms of effort.             
Indeed, when forks in FLOSS communities occur, those who decide to fork the code usually               
need to create a new infrastructure from scratch . The use of decentralised technologies             23
offers, in this respect, a promising field of experimentation and exploration of potential             
changes in these dynamics. The inherent properties of decentralised technologies facilitate           
the forking of the whole infrastructure and even the communitarian rules which have been              
encoded in them, as discussed in the previous section. In other words, BDFLs or institutions               
might not only fear the forking of code, but of the whole infrastructure and a large set of the                   
(codified) community rules. While the “right to fork” may be perceived as an aspect unique to                
FLOSS communities, a similarity has been observed in other CBPP communities, such as             
communities maintaining wikis (Tkacz, 2014; Jemielniak, 2016). Continuing with the case of            
Wikipedia, for example, a similar fork occurred in 2002. In this case, the fork relates to the                 
Spanish version of Wikipedia through a project known as the ​Enciclopedia Libre Universal             
en Español . This episode marked the first detailed account of “post-software” forking            24
(Enyedy & Tkacz, 2011, p. 111): a fork outside of purely software-based projects, which              
entailed a manual, difficult, and sometimes precarious (Enyedy & Tkacz, 2011, p. 116)             
process of replication of contents and infrastructure. The tension reached its apex when one              
of the co-founders of Wikipedia announced the intention to study the inclusion of             
advertisements in the encyclopedia (Enyedy & Tkacz, 2011, p. 113), leading to the fork.              
What would have been the scenario if Wikipedia’s infrastructure had been running as part of               
a DAO in 2002? Unfortunately, we can only speculate. We could expect, however, that the               
relationships between social and technical power would probably be different. Those           
responsible for the fork argue that its impact was substantial for how Wikipedia currently              25
operates (Enyedy & Tkacz, 2011, pp. 115-117): 
 
[...] the International Wikipedia that you all know and have come to take for granted, might                
have been impossible without the Spanish fork. Wales was worried that other foreign             
23 The case of Backdrop (see ​https://backdropcms.org/​, last accessed on 26/06/2018), the first fork of               
Drupal core to continue with our example, illustrates these usual scenarios well. 
24 The project can be translated as the “Free and Universal Encyclopedia in Spanish”. See               
http://enciclopedia.us.es​, last accessed on 26/06/2018. 
25 This argument was admitted by Larry Sanger, one of the co-founders of Wikipedia who proposed                
the addition of advertisements as a reply to this article: 
“[...]But to give credit where it is due, Mr. Enyedy is correct that the fork of the Spanish Wikipedia                   
might well have been the straw that finally tipped the scales in favor of a 100% ad-free Wikipedia. [...]”  
(see ​http://www.wired.co.uk/article/wikipedia-spanish-fork​, last accessed on 26/06/2018). 
However, this was denied by Jimmy Wales, the other co-founder (see           
http://larrysanger.org/2011/01/jimmy-wales-on-advertisement/ last accessed on 26/06/2018). In any       
case, the purpose of this article is not to analyse the polemic, but rather to refer to this episode in                    
order to illustrate the existence of these tensions, and the role played by the forms of pressure                 
generated by “the thread of forking” in CBPP communities beyond FLOSS.  
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communities would follow our fork. He learnt from us what to do and what not to do in future.                   
[...] The project [Enciclopedia Libre Universal en Español] itself was not intended to last. It               
was merely a form of pressure. [...] 
 
These examples allow us to imagine scenarios of the possible opportunities gained by             
decentralising power over infrastructure in CBPP. Decentralised technologies may shape          
these dynamics by offering a higher degree of pressure for negotiation on those holding              
more power in the community and fostering permissionless innovation (Thierer, 2016).           
Continuing with our community network example, part of the centralised infrastructure, such            
as that related to monitoring contributions (e.g. to provide an antenna to connect 5 houses),               
could be decentralised. This would facilitate the deployment of alternative networks able to             
operate as the former, and to reuse and adapt the encoded rules of the community while still                 
using the shared infrastructure. Thus, decentralisation of the infrastructure reduces the           
technical cost to fork the community, reducing the power within the community of those              
previously in control of the infrastructure.  
 
When we analyse this affordance through Ostrom’s principles, we identify a set of aspects              
which relate to them. Firstly, those holding more power within the community may             
experience higher pressure with regards to the constant processes of negotiation of            
collective choice arrangements — the 3​rd of the principles. Secondly, in connection with the              
4​th of Ostrom’s principles, those monitoring the commons could also experience new forms             
of pressure regarding their expected accountability in the eyes of the community. Thirdly,             
within this scenario, the decentralisation of power over infrastructure could facilitate           
permissionless innovation and thus, a higher degree of autonomy to the local spaces which              26
emerge over time. Thus, the differences in the forms of pressure may provide new              
conditions for the negotiations that relate to having their local contexts and jurisdictions             
acknowledged by higher authorities — in congruence with the 2​nd and 7​th of Ostrom’s              
principles respectively. 
 
Nevertheless, this affordance for decentralisation of power over infrastructure is not free of             
risks and requires further exploration. A risk which can be clearly envisioned is that of the                
shift of power to those coding the rules, as previously discussed for the cases of               
tokenisation, self-enforcement and formalisation of rules. Additionally, the aforementioned         
higher degree of pressure for negotiation or permissionless innovation could result in            
increasing risks of the constant fragmentation of the community. The issue is not new. Large               
CBPP communities, for example, constantly aim to navigate these tensions to “loosen            
control without losing control ” while trying to scale up (Rozas, 2017, pp. 297-318). The key               27
aspect resides in furthering our understanding on how to integrate this affordance for             
decentralisation of power over the infrastructure into the day-to-day practices of these            
communities. 
26 The coordination of different local groups would tentatively require a higher degree of              
interoperability. Interoperability will be discussed in further detail as part of the affordance of              
codification of trust. 
27 This motto was coined by Dries Buytaert, founder of the Drupal project, when explaining his views                 
on how FLOSS communities manage to scale up while continuing to innovate. See             
https://opensource.com/open-organization/15/12/how-open-source-solves-innovation-problem​, last  
accessed on 26/06/2018. 
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4.5 ​ Transparentisation  
 
Transparentisation refers to the process of opening the organisational processes and the            
associated data by relying on the persistency and immutability properties of blockchain            
technologies. Blockchain enthusiasts envision a blockchain governance as one that “takes           
advantage of the public record-keeping features of blockchain technology: the blockchain as            
a universal, permanent, continuous, consensus-driven, publicly auditable, redundant,        
record-keeping repository.” (Swan, 2015, p.44). 
 
As previously argued, commons-based approaches towards the use of blockchain          
technologies may want to consider treading cautiously regarding these techno-determinist          
views. Firstly, opening processes is a far more complex social organisational problem than             
simply opening data. Secondly, as Atzori (2015, p.16) shows, techno-determinist views tend            
to be based on “claims [that] are somehow overstated, since they do not take enough               
account of the several performance risks at stake”. Blockchain technologies provide,           
however, a potential for CBPP communities to socially construct software in which certain             
actions and operations are more easily trackable, auditable and communally fiscalised by            
their participants. CBPP communities have, indeed, a long tradition of aiming to make their              
processes as open and participative as possible. Examples of these data are the materials              
generated as a result of the encounters when decisions are made, or the indicators of the                
degree of participation in the community. This strong culture of openness and participation in              
CBPP communities connects with the 4​th and 6​th of Ostrom’s principles. The opening of the               
data generated in the collaboration processes in the communities is a useful means for              
CBPP communities to successfully carry out and scale up their processes of monitoring.             
They increase the legitimacy of these processes and provide means of accountability for             
those who participate in them in the eyes of the community. These data are also commonly                
employed as part of conflict resolution mechanisms as well as in the constant processes of               
negotiation. One can think, for example, of the enormous amount of contents which can be               
found in the discussion pages of Wikipedia; or in the issues lists of FLOSS communities.               
These large amounts of data are not commonly solely related to the objects of the efforts,                
but also to the organisational processes themselves. 
 
The experimentation with software drawing on blockchain technologies provides new          
possibilities for CBPP communities to track and communally fiscalise new aspects of their             
processes. Continuing with the example of community networks, this transparency can help            
to identify who uses more resources, the community can then either try to grant these               
resources or to penalise excessive usage; those who contributed more can also be             
rewarded or recognised accordingly. 
 
As with the previously discussed affordances, however, commons-based approaches         
towards the use of ​blockchain-based tools for governance should be aware of the limitations.              
Khan (2016, p. 132), for instance, places this discussion into the more general one of privacy                
and the right to be forgotten in the digital age (Mayer-Schönberger, 2011). The permanent              
nature of blockchain opens up scenarios in which “everything is recorded” and "will forever              
tether us to all our past actions, making it impossible, in practice, to escape them" (Rosen,                
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2010). Extreme transparency in the context of self-governance of CBPP communities raises            
similar questions: what kind of participation information should be permanently stored? Or,            
how might a scenario with a higher degree of transparency shape the development of              
participants’ identities in the communities? As with the case of the previously discussed             
affordances, transparentisation through blockchain will require commons-based approaches        
to explore and experiment to determine the limits and how to integrate and situate a potential                
higher degree of transparency into the day-to-day practices of these communities. 
 
4.6 ​ Codification of trust 
 
Trustlessness is one of the most cited characteristics by blockchain enthusiasts to argue for              
the disruptive potential of this technology. When framed in terms of processes, it can be               
understood as that of codifying trust into “trustless systems” developed under a blockchain.             
In simple terms, trustless systems are those which enable participants to enter into an              
agreement, without requiring a third party, to provide a certain degree of trust between them.  
 
In the context of technological artefacts to facilitate governance, commons-based          
approaches should be aware of the limitations and underlying values incorporated by            
dominant techno-determinist views. Thus, commons-based approaches could aim to         
re-interpret “trustlessness” as a partial property which may act as a potential source of              
affordances in the context of commons governance. An example of these limitations relates             
to the transfer of trust encompassed in the design and development of these trustless              
systems. For example, when considering the use of smart contracts to facilitate governance,             
trust is transferred to the code that defines them, and subsequently to those who write the                
code. This shift of trust has been framed by blockchain enthusiasts by re-interpreting the              
well-known Lessig’s (1999) dictum “Code is Law” motto. Even in predominant           
techno-determinist discourses, however, an awareness of the shift of trust from code to             
those who code is starting to emerge. Trustlessness is discussed more as a partial than an                
absolute property (BTC Studios, 2017): 
 
“[...] Even an open-source project like Bitcoin that is constantly being reviewed can have              
trust issues, not from the code but by the developers and reviewers of the code. So                
trustlessness is more of a term describing an ideal state on the blockchain where code is law                 
with the caveat that humans write code and to err is human.” 
 
Secondly, techno-determinist views tend to emphasise contractual transactions between         
individuals as the key pillar for the foundation of the society and invisibilise, or even abhor,                
collective action (Flood & Robb, 2017). On occasions, these views fall on hobbesian values,              
in which the blockchain acts as a “crypto-leviathan” (Reijers et al., 2016) enforcing a social               
contract between inherently selfish and power-seeking individuals. Commons-based        
approaches could focus on the affordances generated by this partial property of            
trustlessness to foster collective action and the scaling up of self-organisational processes of             
CBPP communities.  
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From this process of codification of trust, and returning to the context of Ostrom’s principles,               
an affordance regarding interoperability in CBPP communities can be envisioned. In           
technical terms, interoperability refers to the property of a system to operate with other              
systems through a series of interfaces. Blockchain provides affordances to increase the            
degree of collaboration not only through the generation of interfaces, but also by providing a               
full communal infrastructure: a shared decentralised database. This affordance for the           
codification of trust relying on a communal infrastructure allows us to envision potentialities             
at several levels. Firstly, and in connection with the 7​th and 8​th of Ostrom’s principles, to                
facilitate internal interoperability among the different groups or nodes that form part of CBPP              
communities, or the multiple layers of nested enterprises in Ostrom’s terms. Thus, and             
returning again to our previous example of a community network, with local nodes in Madrid               
and Barcelona, one can envision artefacts designed to facilitate the governance of CBPP             
communities in the form of different locally-shaped platforms. These platforms could be            
autonomously governed by the participants who belong to each of the nodes, but             
interoperate between them and/or with a federal platform at a broader level. Thus, the              
process of codification of trust would not simply refer to the individuals and their atomic               
interactions. Instead, it could include the agreements arranged between the nodes that form             
part of the community, fostering the capacity of these communities to scale up some of their                
self-organisational processes, as in the example of the collaboration of networks. 
 
Secondly, a blockchain as a common database infrastructure generates affordances for           
interoperability beyond the boundaries of a particular CBPP community. In the context of             
governance, this affordance for codification of trust could be envisioned as a source of              
experimentation and exploration of initiatives intended to increase interoperability between          
different CBPP communities. For example, a set of smart contracts which encode            
agreements between community networks, or by reflecting the decisions made by different            
community networks with regards to their different notions of value and ways to make them               
interoperable (De Filippi & Hassan, 2015). Nevertheless, as with the previously discussed            
affordances, the processes related to the codification of trust in ways that facilitate             
interoperability between and within CBPP communities will remain as social processes of            
negotiation. As such, they are not exempt from similar risks.  
 
In sum, while blockchain technologies provide capabilities to improve trust in transactions,            
the key for commons-perspectives may reside in experimenting and finding ways to employ             
them to foster collective action. This process encompasses the need to integrate social             
culture and practices, while exploring and furthering understanding of what these risks and             
limits are. 
5​. Discussion and concluding remarks 
 
This article contributes to the emergent debate on ​blockchain-based governance by           
providing a perspective focussed on commons governance, namely that of CBPP           
communities. This perspective is novel because it performs a systematic analysis which            
does not rely on techno-determinist views and logics of private markets (e.g Swan, 2015;              
Hayes, 2016; Heuermann, 2015), nor on the assumption of the need for coercion by              
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traditional centralised institutions (Atzori, 2015). As mentioned in section 2, several authors            
have recently made some initial attempts to link the commons with blockchain technologies.             
In fact, Calcaterra (2018) mentions how Ostrom’s 8 principles could be applied to DAOs, and               
Shackelford & Myers (2017) review the applicability of the 8 principles focusing on             
governance of blockchains (instead of ​with blockchains). Other authors, without mentioning           
blockchain, consider how Ostrom’s principles could be formalised and mathematised (Pitt et            
al., 2012; Pitt et al., 2014), or applied to algorithmic governance (Pitt & Diaconescu, 2014).               
However, none of them carry out a systematic and in-depth analysis of blockchain             
affordances with respect to CBPP communities, nor do they tackle how each affordance may              
support Ostrom’s principles, nor how community governance may be affected, positively or            
otherwise.  
In this article we bring together literature on the governance of commons within that of               
blockchain-based governance to identify a set of affordances which could facilitate the            
governance of CBPP communities. In turn, we discuss the identified affordances in the             
context of Ostrom’s (1990) classic principles for commons governance. Table 5.1 provides a             
summary of the relationships discussed between the identified affordances and the           
principles. 
 
 Tokenisa
-tion 
Self-enforce-
ment and 
formalisation 
Autonomous 
automatisati-
on 
Decentralisation 
of power over 
infrastructure 
Transparenti-
sation 
Codification 
of trust 
(1) Clearly  
defined 
community 
boundaries 
✔      
(2) 
Congruence 
between rules  
and local  
conditions 
✔ ✔  ✔   
(3) Collective 
choice 
arrangements 
✔   ✔   
(4) Monitoring  ✔ ✔ ✔ ✔  
(5) Graduated 
sanctions 
 ✔ ✔    
(6) Conflict 
resolution 
mechanisms 
  ✔  ✔  
(7) Local 
enforcement of 
local rules 
 ✔  ✔  ✔ 
(8) Multiple   ✔   ✔ 
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layers of 
nested 
enterprises 
Table 5.1: Summary of the relationships between the identified affordances of blockchain 
technologies for governance and Ostrom’s (1990) principles. 
 
The congruences identified between the affordances and these principles allow us to            
speculate on the impact that decentralised ​blockchain-based technologies could have on           
governance processes in these communities. These decentralised technologies could         
facilitate coordination, help to scale up commons governance or even be useful to share              
agreements and different forms of value amongst various communities in interoperable           
ways. The identified affordances are, however, not to be considered as an exhaustive list.              
Instead, they should be interpreted as a set of potential processes which may help these               
communities to tackle issues related to the problems faced while trying to decentralise their              
organisational processes in order to scale up. Examples of issues previously identified in the              
literature (e.g. Viégas et al., 2007; Forte et al., 2009; Schweik & English, 2013; Wang &                
Cheliotis, 2016; Rozas, 2017) that relate to the identified affordances are the need to              
increase the degree of formalisation of their processes to provide higher degrees of             
legitimacy, transparency and trust. 
 
As in the case of most of the emergent literature on governance through blockchain, our               
analysis is theoretical and speculative. This is not an uncommon issue when analysing the              
impact of novel and potentially disruptive technologies. The contribution of analyses as those             
presented in this article resides, however, in facilitating the emergence and identification of             
categories which, by drawing on classic literature as in the case of Ostrom’s studies, allows               
us to more clearly open new research questions to explore. Examples of these research              
questions are those discussed with regards to the limits of the processes of the tokenisation               
or formalisation of rules: which aspects should remain in/off the blockchain, or furthermore             
completely in/out of code? Thus, by providing a perspective focussed on commons            
governance we do not simply identify the potentialities, but also possible drawbacks and             
limitations which have not been acknowledged by predominant techno-determinist views, nor           
identified and analysed in-depth by critical approaches which have not considered the power             
of self-organisation of communities. All of these aspects, and the related research questions,             
require further exploration. In addition, further analysis to explore approaches focussed on            
commons governance could draw on different literature on self-organisation beyond          
Ostrom’s. A similar analysis drawing on the principles of platform cooperativism (Scholz,            
2016) — as in the call made by De Filippi & Lavayssière (2018) — could help us to identify                   
new affordances, drawbacks, risks and limitations of the use of blockchain technologies in             
this context. In this sense, this article represents an initial effort and a call to systematically                
bring together literature on self-organisation to the emerging debate on blockchain-based           
governance. 
 
Furthermore, a better understanding of the capabilities of blockchain technologies for           
commons governance will require further empirical research. The co-design of technological           
artefacts for governance will need to be carried out together with those who may potentially               
use them for collective action. This should enable the development of situated technology,             
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with an awareness of the cultural context and aiming to incorporate particular social             
practices into the design. In this sense, CBPP communities provide radically differing values             
and practices when compared with those in markets. CBPP communities show us how             
cooperation can triumph over competition, although today they represent a minority view. As             
we have attempted to show, blockchain may facilitate cooperation in new ways. We hope              
this combination may open a new path for the popularisation of CBPP and the much needed                
cooperation in our societies. 
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